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Throughout the years 1953 to 1973, the Central Intelligence
Agency was engaged in an operation designated as the East Coast
Mail Intercept.' The objective of the operation, which allegedly was

based in New York City, 2 was the opening, inspecting and photographing of first class mail sent to or coming from the Soviet Union. 3
4
This activity was carried on without the benefit of a search warrant.
5
In 1975, a group of American citizens filed a class action suit in the
federal district court of Rhode Island 6 against thirty present and
former federal government officials, charging that the defendants
conducted and conspired to conduct a surreptitious mail interception
and thereby violated the first, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments to

1 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, para. 53, Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 387 n.1
(D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub norn.
Colby v. Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979). The operation was called HTLINGUAL and a description
can be located in the Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities. United States Senate Book III, at 559-679. Brief for
Respondents at n.3, Colby v. Driver, No. 78-303 (U.S. 1979). It is estimated that 215,000
pieces of mail were read during this period. Id. at 3.
2 Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 149 n.3 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom.
Colby v.
Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979).
3 Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 387 (D.R.I. 1977), affd in part, rev'd in part, 577
F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979).
" Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 45 & 52.
5 Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 387 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 577
F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979). Rodney
Driver, a resident of Rhode Island, is a professor of mathematics at the University of Rhode
Island, and had corresponded with fellow mathematicians in the Soviet Union. Michael Avery, a
resident of Connecticut, is an attorney and had visited the Soviet Union as an exchange student.
B. Leonard Avery, a resident of Minnesota, is the father of Michael and had received correspondence from his son. Victoria Wilson, a resident of New York City, had corresponded with
her father who was in the Soviet Union researching a novel. Julia Siebel, a resident of California, corresponded with friends in the Soviet Union. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, supra note
1, at paras. 3-7.
6 Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 408 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 577 F.2d
147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979). The actual
number and identity of the members of the class were known only to the CIA. The plaintiffs
contended that the class numbered in the tens of thousands. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint,
supra note 1, at para. 42.
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the Federal Constitution, and various federal statutes. 7 They also alleged that in having conspired to commit these constitutional torts,
the defendants became personally liable for money damages. 8 The
plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant
Clarence Kelley, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 9
In addition, they sought compensatory and punitive damages from
each of the other defendants, who were sued both in their individual
and official, or former official, capacities. 10
At the outset of the suit, the defendants, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction."
They demonstrated
by way of uncontroverted affidavits that they had not been served
with process in Rhode Island, that they did not reside in or have any
contact with that State, and that the complaint did not allege that any
2
of the wrongful activity had occurred there.'
The district court denied the motion and held that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(e) 13 was properly relied upon in an action which sought to re-

7 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 8-37 & 53-59, The defendants
included among others, the directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Post
Office Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the time of filing suit as well as
past directors and subordinate officers. For a complete list of the defendants, see Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 8-37. The United States moved to become a party
defendant and the motion was granted. Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 387 n.2 (D.R.I. 1977),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nor. Colby v.
Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979).
The alleged violations were: fourth amendment (security from unreasonable search and seizures); first amendment (freedom of speech); first, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments (right to
privacy); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702, 1703, 1708 & 1709 (1976) (prohibiting interference with the
United States mails). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 59.
s Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 59; see 42, U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976).
9 Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 387 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 577
F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nor. Colby v. Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979). The
FBI necessarily became involved in the East Coast Mail Intercept because of its dominion over
domestic security operations. See id.
50 Id. The plaintiffs requested $20,000 per letter intercepted as compensatory damages and
$100,000 punitive damages for each member of the class. The damages could total in excess of
one billion dollars. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 59.
" Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 387 (D.R.I. 1977), affd in part, rev'd in part, 577 F.2d
147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub noam. Colby v. Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979). The defendants also moved to dismiss because of improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) and insufficiency of
process under Rule 12(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 387.
12 Brief for Appellants at 5-6, Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted
sub nom. Colby.v. Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979).
13 Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, § 2, 76 Stat. 744. Section 1391(e) and section
1361 were enacted as The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962. The act originally read as follows:
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cover money damages from a federal official's personal resources. 14
The court ruled that section 1391(e), when applicable, provided in
personam jurisdiction,' 5 that such a grant of jurisdiction did not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment' 6 and, finally, that
section 1391(e) effected jurisdiction over former as well as present

§ 1361. Action to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of
mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.
9 1391. Venue generally
(e) A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of
legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a
defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real
property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real
property is involved in the action.
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and
complaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.
Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, §§ 1(a), 2, 76 Stat. 744.
Section 1391(e) was amended in 1976. The word "each" was changed to "a" in the first
sentence and the following sentence was added to the end of the first paragraph:
Additional persons may be joined as parties to any such action in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other venue requirements as
would be applicable if the United States or one of its officers, employees, or agencies were not a party.
Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 3, 90 Stat. 2721.
14 Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 392-98 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in'part, rev'd in part, 577
F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979).
Is Id. at 389-92. Plaintiffs also claimed jurisdiction on the basis of Rhode Island's long-arm
statute. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1956). The court never considered that basis for jurisdiction
since it found § 1391(e) to be applicable. 74 F.R.D. at 400 n.23.
16 74 F.R.D. 382, 390-91 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979). The district court
reasoned that the fourteenth amendment due process constraints regarding jurisdiction and the
state courts as defined in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (minimum
contacts and substantial fairness) were not applicable to this set of facts. Such a test, the court
ruled, was only applicable when jurisdiction was asserted over one outside the territorial limits
of the sovereign. When Congress authorizes nationwide service of process, the court noted, the
entire nation is its territory and therefore the proper due process test is that applied to intraterritorial jurisdiction. 74 F.R.D. at 391. That test, as defined in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), is notice which is reasonably calculated to inform the defendant of the pendency of the suit. 74 F.R.D. at 391.
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officials of the federal government. 1 7 In Driver v. Helms,", the First
Circuit affirmed except insofar as the district court held that section
1391(e) applied to former government officials. 19
Section 1391(e) was enacted as the second half of The Mandamus
and Venue Act of 196220 and defines venue in "[a] civil action in
which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or
an agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal
authority." 21 It also provides for service of process beyond the territorial limits in which the action was brought.2 2 Since its passage,
the federal courts have struggled to define its scope. 2 3 The phrases,
"[a] civil action" and "under color of legal authority," have raised the
question whether the statute should be interpreted literally, such that
section 1391(e) can be relied upon to effect in personam jurisdiction
in virtually any civil action against a federal official, or whether it was
only intended to supply jurisdiction in cases involving review of ad24
ministrative acts and relief in the nature of mandamus.
In order to fully understand the complexities of this problem, it
is necessary to examine the circumstances surrounding the statute's

17 74 F.R.D. 382, 398-400 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979). The court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) moved for an interlocutory appeal because its "resolution of the difficult jurisdictional question . . . involve[d] a controlling question of law as to which there [was] substantial ground for difference of opinion." Id. at 402. Twenty-five of the defendants joined in the
appeal. Brief for Appellants, supra note 12, at 3 n.1.
Is 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 439 U.S. 1113
(1979).
19 Id. at 149-51.
20 Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, §§ 1(a), 2, 76 Stat. 744. For the complete text of

the statute, see note 13 supra. The first part expanded the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal district courts, outside of Washington, D.C., to include mandamus actions against federal employees, officials and agencies. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
21 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976).
22 Id. Service of process upon the United States or an officer or agency of the United States
is governed by Rule 4(d)(4) and 4(d)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 4(f),.
however, such service of process is limited to the territorial limits of the state unless otherwise
provided by statute or rules. The passage of section 1391(e) allowed for the disregard of the
territorial limits of the state.
2 Compare Blackburm v. Goodwin, 608 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1979) with Briggs v. Goodwin,
569 F.2d I (D.D.C. 1977), cert. granted sub noam. Stafford v. Briggs, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979).
24 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976). It is clear that section 1391(e) was not intended to apply to
personal damage actions based on a purely private wrong, i.e., an automobile accident caused
by a postal employee on his way home from work. 577 F.2d 153. See note 112 infra and
accompanying text.
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introduction and its evolution into its present form. The legislation
was first introduced by Idaho Congressman Homer Budge in 1958.25
At that time, if someone wanted to compel a federal officer to perform an official duty, he had to travel to Washington, D.C. to initiate
a mandamus action. 2 6 This inconvenience was the result of an "historic accident" by which only the federal courts of Washington, D.C.
had original subject matter jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. 2 7
The problem was exacerbated by the doctrine of indispensable
parties 2 8 -attempts to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief against a
federal official would normally be dismissed for failure to join a
superior officer stationed in Washington. 29 Persons residing outside

H.R. 10892, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
26 577 F.2d at 151.
27 H.R. REP. No. 1936, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960). See S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2784; H.R. REP. No. 536,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See also 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1107 (1969); Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REv. 308 (1967).
The prohibition against federal district courts outside Washington, D.C. issuing writs of
mandamus has its roots in the early decision of Marbury v. Madison which established that the
Supreme Court did not have the power to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal official. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). A similar result was later reached in a case
which considered the lower federal courts' mandamus power. Mclntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 504, 505-06 (1813).
The restrictions on the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus was relaxed slightly in Kendall v. United States, where the court held that the federal
courts in the District of Columbia did have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 615-26 (1838). The predominant reason for
that holding was that the courts in Washington, D.C. were not only federal courts but also the
inheritors of the common law powers of the courts of Maryland, from which the District of
Columbia was carved. 37 U.S. at 618-22. See Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 1, 2 Stat. 103
(1801).
Congress, prior to 1962, had enacted a few statutes which granted mandamus power to the
district courts in particular areas. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1914) (to enforce investigatory
powers of Federal Trade Commission); 47 U.S.C. § 11 (1934) (to enforce orders of Federal
Communications Commission). For a more complete list, see Note, Mandatory Injunctions as
Substitutes for Writs of Mandamus in the FederalDistrict Courts, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 905
n. 13 (1938). Of course, all federal courts could issue writs of mandamus ancillary to jurisdiction
acquired from an independent source. Byse & Fiocca, supra, at 311-12.
25

2' See FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a) and cases cited in 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 28.08

(1958 & Supp. 1965).
29 577 F.2d at 151.
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of the District of Columbia, unable to obtain proper venue 30 or effect
service of process 3 1 on out of state parties, were effectively denied
judicial review of the conduct of federal government officials. 32 In
order to correct this procedural inequity, Congressman Budge developed a plaintiff-oriented venue and service of process statute,
House of Representatives Bill 10892, 33 which provided that civil actions against officials of the federal government sued in their official
capacity could be brought in the district in which the plaintiff resided. 34 The legislation further provided that service of process
35
could be made upon the local United States Attorney.
H.R. 10892 was reintroduced during the next session of Congress
as H.R. 10089.36 It was sent to the Committee on the Judiciary who
requested and received. opinions regarding the legislation from various agencies, most notably the Judicial Conference of the United
States and the Department of Justice. The Judicial Conference approved the bill in principle but recommended that the venue be
broadened "to include the district in which the cause of action arose
or in which the property involved in the action [was] situated." 3 7 The
Department of Justice, however, was far less enthusiastic about the
legislation. In a letter authored by Deputy Attorney General Lawrence Walsh, the Department emphasized two major problems with
the bill. 3 8 First, the letter explained that the type of action de-

30 Prior to 1962, venue in civil actions brought against federal officers or agencies was determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976) because such suits usually involved a federal question.
At that time, section 1391(b) stated that: "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded
solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, except as otherwise provided by law." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 935.
This section, however, was amended in 1966 to provide for venue also in the district where the
claim for relief arose. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, §§ 1, 2, 80 Stat. 1111. Section
1391(e) now supersedes section 1391(b) in regard to civil actions against federal officers,
employees or agencies acting in their official capacity or under color of legal authority.
3' See note 22 supra.
32 E.g., McNeil v. Leonard, 199 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont. 1961); Lemmon v. Social Sec.
Admin., 20 F.R.D. 215 (D.C.S.C. 1957).
:3 H.R. 10892, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
4 Id.
35 Id.
38 H.R. 10089, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
37 Letter from Warren Olney III, Director of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
to Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, May 3, 1960,
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 5.
38 Letter from Lawrence E. Walsh, Deputy Attorney General to Representative Emanuel
Celler, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary (undated), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
1936, supra note 27, at 5-6 [hereinafter cited as Walsh Letter].
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scribed in H.R. 10089, i.e., against an officer in his official capacity,
was often a mandamus action and, even under the new legislation,
such suits, could only be brought in Washington, D.C. 39 Although
Representative Budge's legislation had solved the venue and service
of process problems presented by the doctrine of indispensable parties, it had failed to correct the jurisdictional (subject matter) limitation prohibiting mandamus actions in the local federal courts.
Second, the letter noted that the bill, by stating "against an officer .. .in his official capacity," 40 would not cover certain types of
4
suits which were occasionally brought against a government official. '
These were suits which, although pertaining to official conduct, were
brought against an officer in his individual capacity. 42 The Department was apparently referring to the legal fiction created by the Supreme Court's decision in Ex Parte Young. 4 3 That fiction made possible suits against the government that had been traditionally barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 4 4 By holding that an official who
acts beyond the scope of his authority is stripped of his official capacity, the Supreme Court allowed suits, in essence against the United
45
States, to be brought nominally against government officials.
The letter contained two examples of the type of lawsuit that
would not be covered by the proposed legislation. 4 6 The first was

39 Id. at 6.
40 H.R. 10089, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
41 Walsh Letter, supra note 38, at 6.
42 Id.
43 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Court in Ex Parte Young created this "stripping" fiction in the

following passage:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the
Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into

conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped
of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct.
Id. at 159-60. Although Young was an action to enjoin a state official, it also has been applied to
federal officials. Larsen v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
44 WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, 207-08 (3d ed. 1976).
45 209 U.S. at 159-60.
46 Walsh Letter, supra note 38, at 6.

The Justice Department also pointed out a deficiency in the service of process. Id. This was
corrected in the revised bill, H.R. 12622, by providing that the summons and complaint could
be mailed beyond the territorial limits of the district. H.R. REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 4.
In view of the substantial deficiencies found in the legislation, the department declined to
recommend its passage. Walsh Letter, supra note 38, at 6.
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clearly a reference to the kind of suit permitted by the Ex Parte
Young doctrine. 4 7 The second, however, contained confusing language which subsequently reappeared in the congressional reports
and which ultimately became a major factor in the First Circuit's
holding.48 This example described suits in which damages are sought
from an officer "personally" for actions allegedly "in excess of his official authority" but apparently taken "in the course of his official
duty."

49

In response to the criticism of H.R. 10089, the bill was revised
and a new draft, H.R. 12622,50 was introduced. The new legislation
incorporated the broader venue provisions which had been suggested
by the Judicial Conference. 5 ' More significantly, H.R. 12622 contained two major additions designed to correct the deficiencies described by the Department of Justice. 5 2 First, a new section was
added in order to correct the mandamus problem. 5 3 This section,
now 28 U.S.C. § 1361, granted all federal district courts original subject matter jurisdiction to "compel an officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof to perform his duty." 54 The second
significant addition was the phrase "or under color of legal authority." 55 H.R. 12622 would now be applicable to an officer "acting in
his official capacity or under color of legal authority." 56 It appears
that the phrase was included to encompass suits which Deputy Attorney General Walsh had described as brought against a federal official
57
in his individual capacity.
17 Id.; see 209 U.S. at 159-60.
48 Walsh Letter, supra note 38, at 6; S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 27, at 3; H.R. REP. No.
536, supra note 27, at 3; see 477 F.2d at 153-54.
49 Walsh Letter, supra note 38, at 6.
50 H.R. 12622, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
51 Id.

:2 H.R. 12622, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. (1960); H.R. REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 9.
3 H.R. 12622, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. (1960); H.R. REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 9.
54 H.R. 12622, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. (1960).
55 Id.
56 Id.
7 H.R. REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 3-4. The House Report explained the inclusion of
the phrase "or under the color of legal authority" as follows:
By including the officer or employee, both in his official capacity and acting
under color of legal authority, the committee intends to make the proposed section
1391(e) applicable not only to those cases where an action may be brought against
an officer or employee in his official capacity. It intends to include also those cases
where.the action is nominally brought against the officer in his individual capacity
even though he was acting within the apparent scope of his authority and not as a
private citizen. Such actions are also in essence against the United States but are
brought against the officer or employee as an individual only to circumvent what
remains of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Id. See H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 27, at 3-4 (similar language repeated).
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The Committee on the Judiciary reviewed H.R. 12622 and recommended it favorably to the House of Representatives where it was
passed unanimously. 58 Unfortunately, Congress adjourned before
the Senate could take action.
During the next session of Congress, H.R. 1960, 5 9 which was
identical to H.R. 12622, was passed unanimously by the House of
Representatives. 6 0 The legislation was then sent to the Senate where
its Committee on the Judiciary received a new evaluation from the
Department of Justice. 6 ' In a critique, authored by Deputy Attorney
General Byron White, the Department continued to find fault with
the legislation. The letter began by questioning the wisdom of expanding the subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts to include mandamus but went on to outline certain improvements the
Department deemed essential. 6 2 First, the Department criticized
the language of section 1361 as being too broad and suggested that
the wording refer specifically to the "mandamus" power. 6 3 The final
64
wording of section 1361 reflected this suggestion.
The Department also suggested that since section 1391(e) was
intended to facilitate the review of official acts, 65 it should "be tied"
to the Administrative Procedure Act which was the congressionally
established vehicle for review of such conduct. 66 In so doing, the
Department contended, there would be "less confusion" about the
scope of section 1391(e) and suits for money judgments against offi58 106 CONG. REC. 18405-06 (1960). The Department of Justice never took an official position on H.R. 12622 in spite of the fact that it was requested to do so at the Hearings. H.R.
REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 4.

59 H.R. 1960, 87th Cong.,
60 H.R. 1960, 87th Cong.,
61 Letter from Byron R.
Chairman, Committee on the

1st Sess. (1961).
1st Sess., 107 CONG. REC. 12157 (1961).
White, Deputy Attorney General to Senator James Eastland,
Judiciary (Feb. 28, 1962), reprinted in S. REP. No. 1992, supra

note 27, at 5-7 also reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 27, at
2788-90 [hereinafter cited as the White Letter].
62 White Letter, supra note 61, at 5--7.
63 Id. at 6.

- 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
65 H.R. REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 1. See S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 27, at 2
(similar language repeated); H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 27, at 1.
66 White Letter, supra note 61, at 6. The department suggested that the following language
be used in section 1391(e):
(e) Except where a special statutory proceeding for judicial review relevant to the
subject matter is provided in any court specified by statute, a civil action for judicial
review of agency action under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (60
Stat. 243, § 10; 5 U.S.C. § 1009) may be brought in any judicial district as above
provided or in any judicial district in which the cause of action arose, or in which
any property involved in the action is situated.
Id. at 7.
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cers would unquestionably be eliminated from its purview. 6 7 This
suggestion was made in the context of the Department's observation
that section 1391(e) "covered an entirely different subject" from section 1361.68 Although the Committee did not adopt this suggestion, 69 it did make other minor changes advocated by the Department. 70 The Committee recommended H.R. 1960, as amended, to
the Senate. On September 20, 1962, the Venue and Mandamus Act
was passed by both the House and the Senate and signed into law on
October 5th by President Kennedy. 71 The statute has only been
amended once to change the wording in section 1391(e) from "each
defendant" to "a defendant," and to add a sentence which would
72
allow for joinder of non-federal third persons.
67Id. at 6.
68

Id.

69 See notes 101-07 infra and accompanying text.
70 S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 27, at 1, 2, 4. The Justice Department believed that the
purpose of the legislation would be better served by making venue proper where the cause of
action arose or where the property in the action was situated. The committee incorporated the
suggestion so that the final version of section 1391(e) allowed venue where (1.) a defendant
resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is
situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if there is no real property involved. Id.
The department had also suggested that the following be added to the end of 1391(e): "This
Act shall not apply to proceedings brought with respect to Federal Taxes." Id. at 7. The committee responded by adding the language "except as otherwise provided by law." id. at 1, 2, 4.
71 When President Kennedy signed the Mandamus and Venue Act, he made the following
statement:
I [h]ave today signed H.R. 1960 which corrects an historic anomaly in the jurisdiction of the United States courts. While the bill creates no new remedies, it will
extend to all district courts the same jurisdiction heretofore enjoyed solely by the
District Court for the District of Columbia to hear actions in the nature of mandamus against Government officials. Thus it will no longer be necessary for citizens
throughout the country to come to the District of Columbia to maintain actions
against government officials.
1962 PuB. PAPERS 738. The President's comments reflect his interpretation that Congress intended to limit section 1391(e) to actions in the nature of mandamus.
After section 1391(e) was passed, Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach sent a memorandum to the United States Attorneys to explain the applicability of section 1391(e):
The venue provision is applicable to-suits against Government officials and agencies
for injunctions and damages as well as suits for mandatory relief. By including in
the venue provision the phrase "or under color of legal authority," the statute
makes the expanded venue applicable not merely to actions for mandatory relief but
also to actions in which the defendant Government official is alleged to have taken
or is threatening to take actions beyond the scope of his legal authority although
purporting to act in his official capacity.
Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach to United States Attorneys (Jan. 18,
1963) (emphasis added). Brief for the United States, at 49 n.34, Colby V. Driver, No. 78-303
(U.S. 1979).
While this memorandum is not part of the legislative history, it is interesting to note
the Deputy Attorney General's broad interpretation of the statute.
72 Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 3, 90 Stat. 2721.
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The Supreme Court has never directly faced the issue of the
intended scope of section 1391(e). In Schlanger v. Seaman, 73 however, the Court observed in a footnote, that the words "a civil action"
in the statute should not be construed to encompass a habeas corpus
action. 74 It is not clear whether habeas corpus was excluded from
the purview of section 1391(e) because of the special nature of that
action or because the legislative history indicated that the phrase "a
75
civil action" should not be construed literally.
The circuit courts have had occasion to interpret the legislative
history of section 1391(e) and have arrived at different conclusions.
The Court of Appeals for, the District of Columbia, in Briggs v.
Goodwin, 76 reasoned much like the First Circuit in Driver. Briggs
involved a personal damage action brought in Washington, D.C.
against federal officials in their individual capacities for alleged constitutional violations. Since some of the defendants had been served
in Florida by certified mail, the district court dismissed the case for
improper venue and insufficiency of process. 77 The appellate court
reversed, holding venue and process to be proper under section
1391(e). 78 It further held, like the Driver court, that such an interpretation of section 13 9 1(e) did not'violate the due process clause
79
of the fifth amendment.
The Second Circuit has construed the application of section
1391(e) far more narrowly. In Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority,80 suit was filed in the southern
district of New York by environmental protection 'organizations to enjoin certain actions of the T.V.A. The Authority's motion to dismiss
for improper venue was denied 8 1 and an appeal was taken. Judge
Friendly, in dictum, stressed that sections 1361 and 1391(e) "must be
read together." 82 He observed that section 1391(e) was not intended
73 401 U.S. 487 (1971).
74 Id. at 490 n.4.
75 id.
76

569 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 439 U.S. 1113

(1979).
77 Briggs v. Goodwin, 384 F. Supp.
78

1228 (D.D.C. 1974).
569 F.2d at 5. Cf. Wu v. Keeney, 384 F. Supp. 1161 (D.D.C. 1974) (although section

1391(e) does not apply to former federal officials, it does apply to defamation suits against present federal officials). The circuit court in Briggs admitted that there were "divergent views on
the relation of section 1391(e) to damage actions against federal officials." 569 F.2d at 5. For a
sampling of such cases, see 569 F.2d at 5-6 n.43.
79 569 F.2d at 8-10.
8) 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972).
81 340 F. Supp. 400, 403-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
82

459 F.2d at 258.
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to apply to all civil actions against federal officials but only to those
suits which previous to its enactment because of certain existing limitations on subject matter jurisdiction and venue could only be
brought with assurance in Washington, D.C. 8 3 Likewise, in
Blackburn v. Goodwin,8 4 the Second Circuit interpreted the legislative history and concluded that section 1391(e) was not intended to
supply jurisdiction in a personal damage action against a federal official. 85 This interpretation of section 1391(e) is in direct conflict with
the position taken by the court of appeals in Driver.
The First Circuit in Driver began its analysis by considering the
application of section 13 91(e) to former officials. 8 6 The court concluded that, based on the plain meaning rule of statutory construction, section 1391(e) was only intended to effect in personam jurisdiction over present officials and employees of the federal government.8 7
The statute provided, "[a] civil action in which 'a defendant is an
officer or employee.' "88 On its face, therefore, section 1391(e) did
not include former officials. The court noted, however, that " 'deference to the plain meaning rule should not be unthinking nor
blind.' "89 Hence, the court felt it was necessary to examine the
legislative history. The court held that, since the plain meaning of the
statute did not bring about either an absurd result or a result that was
clearly at variance with congressional policies, such plain meaning
must prevail. 9 0

Id. at 258-59.
84 608 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1979).
83

85 id. at 925-26.
86 577 F.2d at 149-51. The only defendants who were government employees at the time of
service of process were Richard Helms, James Schlesinger, William Colby, Cord Meyer,
Richard Ober, Vernon Walters and Clarence Kelley. Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 387 n.1
(D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 577 F.2d 147 (lst Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom.
Colby v. Driver, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979).
87 577 F.2d at 150-51.
88

Id. at 150 (emphasis by court) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976)).

89 577 F.2d at 150 (quoting Massachusetts Financial Servs., Inc. v. Securities Investor Pro-

tection Corp., 545 F.2d 754, 756 (1st Cir. 1976).
90 577 F.2d at 150. The appellate court rejected the district court's contention that if a
former official was not covered by section 1391(e), such an official could defeat an action against
him by merely resigning. Judge Coffin stressed that by resigning an official would not escape
liability, but merely prevent the plaintiff from bringing the action in the plaintiff's district. He
could not imagine a career government official resigning for so little gain. Id. The court also
rejected the district court's reasoning that former officials had to be included under section
13 9
1(e) in order to effectuate the purpose of the legislation. Judge Coffin was not convinced
"that Congress meant section 1391(e) to provide a net that could draw everyone connected
with
a governmental action into litigation in a particular district." Id.
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The major issue before the court was whether section 1391(e)
should be relied upon to effect in personam jurisdiction in a suit for
damages against a federal official sued in his individual capacity. 9 1
Initially, it was noted that section 1391(e) simply states " '[a] civil
action' " without any words of limitation. 92 Since Driver involved a
"'civil action' " and the defendants were alleged to have acted
" 'under color of legal authority,' " the case fell within the literal terms of
the statute. 9 3 Second, the Court pointed to the legislative history of
the statute. Although acknowledging that section 1391(e) was originally intended to provide jurisdiction for certain types of actions, the
court concluded that, by the time the legislation was enacted, "at least
some of the members of [the] subcommittee did not want the bill
limited to [such] a narrow purpose."94 judge Coffin supported this
finding by highlighting certain dialogues from the hearings which indicated that a few committee members contemplated section 1391(e)
being applied to any civil suit against government personnel arising
out of their employment. 95
The First Circuit's reliance on selected exchanges from the hearing is somewhat troubling for there are other exchanges which would.
support a contrary conclusion. For example, Representative Budge
clearly stated that he had "no intention of bringing tort actions against
individual government employees ... [but only intended] to have
review of their official actions take place in the United States District
Court where the determination was made." 96 Congressman Dowdy

91 See id. at 151.
92 Id. at 151 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976)).
93 Id. at 151-52 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976)).
94 Id. at 152.
95 Id. at 152-53. The first exchange cited by the court was one between Congressman
Dowdy and Mr. Drabkin, the counsel for the subcommittee. While Mr. Drabkin stated that the
legislation dealt with mandamus and petitions for review, Congressman Dowdy responded that
he hoped that it would not be so limited. Id. at 152. See Hearings on H.R. 10089 Before the
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1960) (unpublished) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]. Because these hearings were unpublished, many decisions regarding section 1391(e)
were made without reference to them. See 577 F.2d at 152 n.16.
The second dialogue cited involved Mr. MacGuineas, a representative of the Department
of Justice, and Congressmen Dowdy and Whitener. Congressman Dowdy suggested that
perhaps section 1391(e) should be applied to all suits, and Congressman Whitener replied that
he did not think "there was any doubt" about such a broad application. Id. at 152. Hearings,
supra, at 53-54. The final dialogue involved Mr. MacGuineas and Congressman Whitener and
was one in which Mr. MacGuineas indicated that section 1391(e) might be used in a slander
suit against a congressman. In response, Congressman Whitener indicated that he thought that
the bill would be properly applied in such situations. 577 F.2d at 152-53; Hearings, supra, at
55-58.
96 Hearings, supra note 95, at 102.
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concluded at one point that he did not think that section 1391(e)
would be applicable to a suit for, money damages against an official in
his individual capacity. 97 It is apparent from these excerpts that little
can be discerned about congressional intent by examining isolated
comments.. The Supreme Court has recognized that remarks made
during legislative debate should be accorded "little weight" unless
made by those who have prepared or drafted the legislation. 9 8
Looking at the hearings in their .totality, it appears that Congress
did not intend general application of the statute, but rather enacted
the statute to correct a)particular "mischief." 99 This interpretation is
buttressed by the House and Senate Reports which serve as summaries of the relevant conclusions established during the hearings. 1 0 0
The court also cited passages from Deputy Attorney General
White's letter as support for its broad interpretation of section
1391(e). 10 1 The statement that section 1391(e) "covered an entirely
different subject" was apparently construed by the court as the Justice Department's acknowledgement that section 1391(e) was no
longer tied to section 1361 and should therefore have broad applica-tion.' 0 2 Judge Coffin expressly took note of the warning from the
Department that if section 1391(e) was not clarified it might be construed to apply to "suits for money judgments against officers." 103 He
inferred that since the Committee did respond to other suggestions in
the Department's letter but did not respond to this particular warning, that such inaction could be construed as the Committee's affirma04
tive choice to have section 1391(e) so applied.
By focusing on a narrow passage from the Justice Department's
letter, the First Circuit appears to have misconstrued the letter's
overall meaning. The White letter was not advocating the broaden97 Hearings, supra note 95, at 87.
98 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203-04 n.24 (1976).

99 Cf., Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1383 (2d Cir. 1970) (section
1391(e) not intended to effect in personam jurisdiction over members of legislative branch).
100 The House and Senate Reports narrowly define the purpose of the Mandamus and Venue
Act as follows:
The purpose of this bill is to make it possible to bring actions against Government officials and agencies in U.S. district courts outside the District of Columbia,
which, because of certain existing limitations on jurisdiction and venue, may now be
brought only in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
H.R. REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 1. Similar language is repeated in S. REP. No. 1992,
supra note 27, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 27, at 1.
201 577 F.2d at 153.
102

Id.

103 Id. See white Letter, supra note 61, at 6.
104 577 F.2d at 153-54.
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ing of the scope of section 1391(e) but was merely suggesting what it
10 5
considered a more appropriate limitation on its application.
Further, the court's inference that the Committee's inaction regarding the Department's suggestion was indicative of affirmative choice is
not sound. Inaction is susceptible of many interpretations and, therefore, is of questionable value. For example, the Committee's rejection
of the Department's suggestion could be construed as evidence of
their continued intention to have sections 1361 and 1391(e) read together.' 0 6
Another justification advanced by the First Circuit was the fact
that section 1391(e) was amended in 1976 to allow for the joinder of
non-federal third parties. 10 7 The court reasoned that such amendments would not have been necessary if the statute were only applicable to mandamus actions.'l0
Although this reasoning, like that derived from the White letter, would support a holding that section
1391(e) has a slightly broader application than strict mandamus, it
does not provide support for holding that Congress intended the statute to be applicable to all civil actions against federal personnel.
A further contention of the court was that by adding "or under
color of legal authority" 109 to the statute, Congress was manifesting
its intention to have the statute "reach a variety of causes of action." 110 Judge Coffin concluded that the only suits which would not
105 White Letter, supra note 61, at 6. The Department's letter recommended that the statute be linked to the Administrative Procedure Act. This would clearly preclude section 1391(e)'s
application to individual damage suits brought against government officials.
10 It should be noted that although the contents of the White letter from the Department
of Justice can be enlightening, it does not reflect legislative intent.
107 577 F.2d at 154. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
108 577 F.2d at 154. Section 1391(e) was amended to eliminate the confusion which had
developed over whether the phrase "each defendant is an officer or employee of the United
States" in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), should be construed literally. Such an issue was usually raised in
a suit for injunctive relief as in Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Department of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968). In Powelton, the plaintiffs, who were affected
by a proposed urban renewal project, requested, among other things, a preliminary injunction
restraining the federal defendants from distributing federal funds. Jurisdiction over the officials
was premised on section 1391(e). This was exactly the type of suit in which section 1391(e) was
intended to supply jurisdiction. It was a suit which could now be brought locally rather than in
Washington, D.C. because section 1391(e) supplied jurisdiction. The defendants, however, attempted to defeat the application of section 1391(e) by arguing that since the plaintiffs had
joined the Philadelphia Re-Development Authority, a local non-federal agency, as a party defendant, that the language of section 1391(e) ("each defendant is an officer or employee of the
United States") precluded the use of that statute. 284 F. Supp. at 833. The court, in rejecting
that argument, held that it would look not only to the literal meaning of the statute but also to
its spirit and intent. Id.
1- 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976).
11 577 F.2d at 153.
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be within the purview of section 1391(e) would be "personal damage
action[s] arising from purely private wrongs.""'
The House and Senate Reports' explanation of the phrase, "under color of legal authority," cannot be reconciled with that of the
First Circuit. The Reports clearly state that the phrase was added to
the statute in order to bring within its scope "those cases where an
action [was] nominally brought against the officer in his individual
capacity even though he was acting within the apparent scope of his
authority and not as a private citizen." 112 The Reports further
explained that these actions were "in essence against the United
States but . . . brought against the officer or employee as an individual only to circumvent what remain[ed] of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity."1 13 Although the court acknowledged the pertinence of this passage, it concluded that it did not clearly preclude
114
the result reached.
The most persuasive authority cited by the First Circuit in support of its position was the following statement found in both the
House and Senate Reports: " 'The venue problem also arises in an
action against a Government official seeking damages from him for
actions which are claimed to be without legal authority but which
were taken by the official in the course of performing his duty.' "115
This statement would appear to reflect an acknowledgment by Congress that section 1391(e) would provide venue in an action to obtain
money damages from a federal official. The sentence on its face, however, is so contrary to the rest of the statements in the Reports, that
one is compelled to seek an interpretation which would more logically
justify its presence as a part of the whole. The essence of this sentence first appeared in the letter written by Deputy Attorney General
Walsh on behalf of the Department of Justice. 116 He was describing
one type of suit which would not be covered under Representative
Budge's original legislation. 11 7 The sentence was subsequently incorporated into the Reports as a situation in which the inconvenient

11 Id.
112 H.R. REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 3-4. Similar language is found in H.R. REP No.

536, supra note 27, at 4. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
113 H.R. REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 4 (emphasis added). Similar language is repeated
in H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 27, at 4.
114 577 F.2d at 154.
115 Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 3); see S.

REP. No. 1992, supra note 27, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 27, at 3.
"8
Walsh Letter, supra note 38, at 6.
117 Id. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
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venue problem arose. 118 An interpretation of this sentence which is
more aligned with the content of the rest of th.e Reports is that which
was proposed by petitioners in their brief to the Supreme Court, 1 9
and which is generally supported by the hearings. 120 The position
asserted was that the damage suits referred to in the Reports were
not personal damage actions as in Driver, but rather those in which a
government official was compelled to pay monies from the government treasury which were owed to the plaintiff, i.e., improperly collected taxes. 12 ' This explanation is reinforced by a later statement in
the report which clearly indicated that regardless of the context in
which the venue problem arose, section 1391(e) was applicable only
to suits "which [were] in essence against the United States." 122
When considering the legislative history of the Mandamus and
Venue Act of 1962, the following conclusions are apparent. The purpose of the Act was to facilitate the review of administrative action by
local federal courts. 123 In order to accomplish that objective, the
statute granted subject matter jurisdiction in mandamus actions to the
local federal courts and broadened the venue and service of process
provision regarding federal employees, officials and agencies.1 24 Section 1391(e) was intended to supply jurisdiction to suits which seek to
enjoin a government official or compel him to perform a duty, which
might involve, inter alia, the return of monies improperly held. What
seems to underlie the First Circuit's holding. is their contention that
although the legislative history does not indicate that section 1391(e)
was intended to apply to a Driver fact pattern, there is nothing in
that history to preclude such an application. 125 Admittedly, the Re118 S.

REP. No. 1992, supra note 27, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 27, at 3; H.R.

REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 3.
119 Brief for Petitioners at 18, Colby v. Driver, No. 78-303 (U.S. 1979).
120 Hearings, supra note 95, at 87. When Judge Albert Mars, Senior Circuit Judge of the
Third Circuit, representing the Judicial Conference, was questioned about suits against an official for money damages, he explained that the context in which such a situation might arise was
in a suit against a collector who had monies which were improperly collected. Id.
121 See Clackamas Cty. v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1954), vacated as moot, 349 U.S.
909 (1955). Other examples of such relief are actions to compel increased pay for federal
employees, National Treasury Emp. Union v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1970); to pay
servicemen their reenlistment bonuses, Coala v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 1101 (D. Conn.
1975); or to recover benefits under a veteran's insurance policy, Kapourelos v. United States,

306 F. Supp. 1034 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 446 F.2d 1181 (3d Cir. 1971).
122 S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 27, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 27, at 3; H.R.
REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 3.
123 S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 27, at 1-2; H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 27, at 1-2; H.R.
REP. No, 1936, supra note 27, at 1-2.
124 S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 27, at 1-2; H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 27, at 1-2; H.R.
REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 1-2.
125 577 F.2d at 154. See text accompanying note 114.
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ports do not contain an express exclusion of suits for money damages
against officials in their individual capacities, however such a result is
implicit because of the Congressional Reports' extensive explanation
of the particular problems which the Act intended to rectify. 126 It
seems clear that Congress intended section 1391(e) to have'a limited
application. The conclusion that the statute was not intended for a
suit such as Driver is further strengthened by the circumstances existing at the time the legislation was drafted and finally enacted. During
that period, 1958-1962, a suit against an official for money damages
was not even a recognizable cause of action in the federal courts.12 7
Since the First Circuit found that section 13 9 1 (e) was properly
relied upon to effect in personam jurisdiction in such a personal damage action, it was then compelled to resolve the question of whether
such a grant of jurisdiction was violative of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. 128 Under Article III, section 1 of the Constitution, Congress has the power to create as few federal district courts as
126 S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 27, at 1-4; H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 27, at 1-4;
H.R. REP. No. 1936, supra note 27, at 1-4.
27 Before 1971, an action to recover compensatory damages from a federal official had to
originate in state court. Since such actions were not considered to raise federal questions, they
were dismissed from federal court for lack of jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1976). In Bell v.
Hood, the Supreme Court held that a claim based on a violation of the fourth amendment
would sustain federal jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946). On remand, however, the district court held that when a federal official acts beyond his constitutional authority,
he is acting in his individual capacity. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Cal. 1947). The
result was that such causes of action would still be limited to state court. They could be, and
often were, removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1964).
A further problem was that prior to 1971 the federal courts were not vested with the
authority to award money damages as a remedy for constitutional torts. Finally, the Supreme
Court, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, held that
acts beyond a federal agent's constitutional limitation would not change his federal status to that
of private citizen. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971). It also held that a damage remedy was inferred in the Constitution.
Id. at 396.
Bivens opened the door to the federal courts for the type of suit presented in Driver. The
question arises, however, whether 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) was intended to supply jurisdiction in
such suits when they were generally non-existent in federal court at the time the legislation was
being drafted (1958-1962). The Respondents argued that such suits were within the contemplation of the congressmen because they existed in state court and were on occasion, removed to
federal court. Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 24-30.
12 Before reaching the due process issue, the court considered appellant's argument that
since § 1391(e), on its face, only referred to venue and service of process, it did not affect in
personam jurisdiction and that jurisdiction would have to be established by some other
mechanism. 577 F.2d at 155. The court, in rejecting that argument, reasoned that service of
process was a vehicle by which the court obtained jurisdiction and therefore since the statute
provided for nationwide service of process, it likewise affected jurisdiction. Id. at 155-56. The
court held that when § 13 9 1(e) was applicable, in personam jurisdiction was automatically established. Id. For cases that have held similarly, see id. at n.24.
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it desires. 12 9 It is also well established that Congress can authorize a
suit arising under federal law to be brought in any one of the inferior
federal courts. 130 Congress has, on occasion, exercised its full powers
and enacted statutes which allow for nationwide service of process
and in doing so, created nationwide in personam jurisdiction. These
statutes are the exception rather than the rule and are generally limited to areas where they are necessary in order to avoid multiple
litigation, such as an interpleader action.1 3 1 The general rule is that
the in personam jurisdiction of the federal district court is bound by
the jurisdictional limitations of the state in which it is located.1 3 2 Although it is clear that Congress has extensive power in designing the
federal judicial system, it is not clear what exact limitations the due
process clause of the fifth amendment place on the exercise of that
power. '33 Little has been written about the topic and while the Su34
preme Court has identified the issue, it has reserved decision.1
The court in Driver analyzed the due process issue in terms of
territorial limits. 135 Their analysis was based on the basic premise
that due process requirements are determined by geographical
boundaries. 136 From that premise two due process standards have
emerged. The Supreme Court held in Milliken v. Meyer 137 that, if a defendant is within the sovereign's territorial limits, then due process
only requires that the defendant be given notice which is reasonably
13 8
calculated to inform him of the pendency of the proccedings.
Later, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,' 39 the Court ruled
that if a defendant is outside the sovereign's territory, then the
" 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' " require that
the jurisdictional power be confined to those who have "minimum
129 U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. Article III, section 1 states, in pertinent part: "The judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Id.
130 Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925). See also United States v.
Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838).
131 For a partial list of such statutes, see 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 4.32 (1), 4.33,
4.42 (1) n.27-44 (2d ed. 1979).
132

FED. R. Civ. P. 4().

It has been suggested that the reason these nationwide service of process statutes have
not been subjected to significant challenges regarding the "reasonableness of requiring suit in a
particular federal judicial district" is because the statutes were so narrowly drafted. Foster,
Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969 Wisc. L. REV. 9, 37.
134 United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 804 n.13 (1948).
135 577 F.2d at 157.
133

136

Id.

137311 U.S. 457 (1940).
138 Id. at 463.

139326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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contacts" with the sovereign.140 In applying these standards to the
federal sovereign, the First Circuit simply reasoned that since the
defendant was within the United States and since section 1391(e)
provided for nationwide service of process by certified mail, the defendants' rights to due process were not violated.141
The First Circuit's resolution of the due process issue follows
well established case law. Underlying that issue, however, is a basic
question, the answer to which remains unclear. That question is
whether territorial considerations alone should determine the due
process standards or whether "fairness" requires consideration of
other factors as well. Looking for guidance at the line of cases which
14 2
have defined the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
it appears that while territorial considerations have not been totally
rejected, 14 3 they merely begin the inquiry which proceeds to an
evaluation of "minimum contacts." 144 In the context of the fifth
amendment, it appears that due process should limit the exercise of
federal in personam jurisdiction to that which is fair and reasonable.1 45 Defining that standard in the realities of the federal system
should not, however, result in the same test which has been established for the exercise of state court jurisdiction-minimum contacts.1 4 6 On the other hand, the fair and reasonable standard in the
federal context should not be satisfied solely by the procedural due
process requirement of notice. 14 7 While notice should be one of the
factors considered, other factors worthy of consideration are: 1) the
defendant's contacts with the forum; 2) the inconvenience to the defendant resulting from distant litigation; 3) the likelihood of mutliplicious litigation; 4) the probable situs of discovery; and, 5) the nature

140

Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)).

141 577 F.2d at 157. Although the First Circuit acknowledged that a government official

might be required to defend himself in a "far-away court," it contended that the defendant's
protection against that unfairness was to have the suit transferred to a more convenient district

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id. It should be noted, however, that the protection accorded
the defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is limited by the fact that the convenience of the
plaintiff and the witnesses must also be considered in the judge's discretionary decision to transfer the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
'42 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).
143 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
144 See Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 203 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
14s Foster, supra note 133, at 36.
14 See Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
147 Id. at 203.
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Although the due process challenge to section 1391(e) is one of
the issues before the Supreme Court, it will not be reached if the
Court holds that Congress did not intend the application of section
1391(e) to a fact pattern as presented in Driver.149 If is submitted
that the legislative history requires such a holding considering the
legislative debates, the House and Senate Reports and the circumstances at the time of the statute's enactment. It is apparent that
the statute was only intended to facilitate the review of administrative
acts which prior to its enactment could only be accomplished by filing
suit in Washington, D.C. Further, the history implicitly indicates
that an extension of the statute's scope beyond that narrow purpose is
unwarranted.
Author's Note:
The United States Supreme Court, in Stafford v. Briggs, 48
U.S.L.W. 4138 (Feb. 20, 1980) (consolidating Colby v. Driver), reversed the First Circuit for reasons substantially identical to those
contained in the above analysis. The Court held that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(e) does not apply to action for money damages brought
against federal officials in their individual capacities. 48 U.S.L.W.
4138, 4142 (Feb. 20, 1980). The holding was based first, on the fact
that sections 1361 and 1391(e) were enacted as one piece of legislation, The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962. The Court concluded,
therefore, that the "civil action[s]" mentioned in section 1391(e) must
be limited by the mandamus actions as defined in section 1361. Id. at
4140. Second, the Court held that the legislative history compelled a
narrow construction, id. at 4142, and, finally, that the inconvenient
consequences which would result from a broad interpretation could
not have been intended by Congress. Id.
Marlene F. Cosentino

148 Id. at 203-04.
149 See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979). In this recent case

the Court supported the general principle that a statute should be construed to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions. Id. at 1322. Since "there is no clear expression of an affirmative
intention [on the part] of Congress" to have § 1391(e) supply in personam jurisdiction to a
Driver fact pattern, the constitutional issue should be avoided. Id. at 1320.

